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Abstract
We conduct an experiment on individual choice under risk in which we study belief
updating when an agent receives a signal that restricts the number of possible states of the
world. Subjects observe a sample drawn from an urn and form initial beliefs about the urn’s
composition. We then elicit how beliefs are modified after subjects receive a signal that
restricts the set of the possible urns from which the observed sample could have been drawn.
We find that this type of signal increases the frequency of correct assessments and that
prediction accuracy is higher for lower levels of risk. We also show that prediction accuracy
is higher after invalidating signals (i.e. signals that contradict the initial belief). This pattern
is explained by the lower level of risk associated with invalidating signals. Finally, we find
evidence for a lack of persistence of choices under high risk.
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We study an assessment problem in which there are several possible states of the
world and agents have to determine which state they are facing. The agent first
observes a sample drawn from all possible states of nature and then a signal that
restricts the set of the possible states of nature. Before receiving the signal, the
agent forms an initial belief based on observing the sample. This initial belief may
or may not be included in the subset of possible states of nature that remains after
receiving the signal. The objective of this paper is to analyze how this type of signal
is used by agents to update their beliefs.
In the theoretical context of incomplete information, belief updating relies on the
use of Bayes’ theorem. However, experiments in both psychology and economics
have shown that this theorem is rarely perfectly implemented in decisions taken
under risk. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) describe heuristics that can ex-
plain consistently observed behaviors in probability updating. In risky situations,
information is key for the economic agent and may take several forms, such as the
probability of an event, an indication of the agent’s behavior or a restriction of the
possible states of nature.
A signal that reduces the number of possible states of nature is found in any
situation in which an object or a person undertakes a pass/fail test, such as those
preceeding the issuance of a label, a diploma or an audit notation. This type of test
provides additional information and is supposed to make the evaluation of an object
or a person easier. Many institutions, such as scientific journals, human resource
consulting or even state medical licensing, adopt minimum certification standards1
or pass/fail strategies. These signals do not allow precise quality assessment of an
object or a person but indicate whether the object or the person is just above the
minimum standard required.
1A standard is defined as a minimum level to achieve.
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For example, we may consider this problem in the context of an employer-employee
relationship. The employer, by observing the employee working in his firm, forms
an initial belief about the employee’s productivity. But the employee’s productivity
may be hard to assess due to difficulties in observing his behavior or due to multi-
tasking. If this is the case, an employee’s performance appraisal may be undertaken
to acquire more information about his productivity level. For a sales person, for
example, the performance appraisal may take the form of a sales objective. What
information about the employee’s productivity does the employer extract from the
observation that the employee succeeds or fails to achieve his sales objective? He does
not observe the precise level of the employee’s productivity, but instead, a reduction
in the range of possible productivity levels.
We examine how this type of signal is used by agents to update their belief
by studying a two-stage task in a laboratory setting. In our experiment, subjects
initially observe a sample of balls drawn from an urn composed of 20 balls, blue
and yellow. We elicit their initial belief about the composition of balls in the urn
by asking subjects to predict the total number of yellow balls contained in the urn.
They then receive a true but imperfect signal about the urn’s composition and are
asked to once again predict the number of yellow balls contained in the urn. Varying
the size of the observed sample and the precision of the signal allows us to study
belief updating in situations characterized by different levels of risk.
On the whole, we find that the signals help subjects in their assessment task and
that the prediction accuracy increases with the precision of the signal. Moreover,
we show that the subjects’ performance is higher after signals that contradict their
initial belief than after signals that confirm it. After receiving a signal that confirms
their initial belief, subjects’ performance is poorer if they change their prediction
between the two parts. This change in predictions happens when the initial risk
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level associated with the state of nature is high and the signal does not reduce it.
Thus, our results suggest beliefs change under risk, whereas the literature (Charness
and Levin, 2005; Friedman, 1998) seems to support the assertion that beliefs are
persistent under risk, in particular, when they are formed voluntarily. Indeed, we
find that the absence of initial belief reinforcement by a validating signal seems to
trigger belief updating. With a high initial level of risk, low accuracy validating
signals appear to confuse the subjects.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 studies the literature on belief
updating. Section 2 describes the experimental design. The data are analyzed in
Section 3 and in Section 4 we discuss our results and conclude.
1 Related Literature
When faced with risk, economic agents use the available information to form their
beliefs. In theory, they should use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs when they re-
ceive new information. However, many experiments in psychology and in economics
have shown that people are not perfect Bayesian updaters and instead tend to use
heuristics in dealing with uncertain events. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982)
analyze three heuristics used in the updating process: representativeness, availability
and anchoring. We will focus our attention on representativeness, which is the most
closely related to our work. The intuition behind representativeness is that people
tend to associate an observed sample with the population it most resembles. When
representativeness and Bayesian reasoning are not in line, the former may drive the
updating process to non-maximizing behavior and lead to a number of errors. For
instance, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) emphasize insensitivity to the prior
probability of outcomes and insensitivity to sample size.
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To study the insensitivity to prior probability Kahneman and Tversky (1973)
conduct an experiment in which two groups of subjects face different descriptions of
people. The first group knows that a population of 100 people is composed of 30 en-
gineers and 70 lawyers. The second group knows that the population is composed of
70 engineers and 30 lawyers. The participants in both groups have to give the prob-
ability that a certain description corresponds to an engineer. When the description
is uninformative, Baysian individuals in the first group should declare a probability
of 0.3 and the participants in the second group should declare a probability of 0.7.
However, the authors find participants in both groups declare the same probability
of 0.5 independently of their base rate. The prior probability stated for the first
(second) group that there are 30% (70%) of engineers in the population is ignored
by the participants. Grether (1980) confirms, in an experiment that conforms to
economic principles, that individuals do not use the base rate when updating beliefs.
He demonstrates that individuals place less weight on the likelihood of information:
they update their belief but less than they should do.
When using the representativeness heuristic, people tend to be insensitive to the
size of the observed sample in the revision process. Tversky and Kahneman (1971)
use an urn containing balls of two different colors to study this phenomenon. They
show that a high proportion of balls of one color in the sample, even if this sample
is small, induces subjects to believe that it comes from the urn that contains a large
amount of balls of that color and leaves them more confident about it than if they
had observed a bigger sample but with a less extreme proportion.2 Thus, the com-
position of the sample seems to matter as much as the size of the sample. In our
2For instance, consider an urn containing balls of two colors: 2/3 are red and 1/3 are white. A first subject
draws 6 balls (5 are red and 1 is white), and a second subject draws 20 balls (12 are red and 8 are white). Asking
individuals about who of the two subjects should feel more confident that the urn from which the sample has
been drawn contains 2/3 of red balls, they answer the first one.
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experiment, the composition and the size of the sample vary to identify this possible
source of error.
Charness and Levin (2005) and Friedman (1998) show the persistence in sub-
jects’ choices, and thus in beliefs, when Bayesian updating would require beliefs to
change. Charness and Levin (2005) examine how the difference between clash and
reinforcement affects the propensity to use Bayes’ rule. Reinforcement supposes that
people are more likely to choose actions associated with successful past outcomes. In
their experiment, the subjects face two equally likely states of the world, “Up” and
“Down”, and two urns, “Left” and “Right”, containing black or white balls. The Up
state of the world is characterized by more black balls in both urns. Moreover, the
Left urn has a mixed composition whereas the Right urn contains balls of only one
color (only black balls in Up and only white balls in Down), thus indicating the state
of the world for sure. The subjects make two draws. For the second draw they choose
to continue drawing in the same urn or to switch. Three treatments are conducted.
They differ by (i) the composition of the Left urn and (ii) the ability to choose from
which urn the first ball is drawn. Bayesian predictions state that the participants
should draw a second time from the Left urn (Right urn) after having drawn a white
ball (black ball) since this represents a failure (success). Charness and Levin (2005)
find that when Bayesian updating and reinforcement are not aligned around 50%
of the decisions are inconsistent with Bayesian updating. They also find that when
the urn used for the first draw is a choice, it is more likely to be chosen again than
when the urn is imposed on the participants. This experiment points out the role of
past successes and the degrees of freedom in subject’s decisions in changing initial
predictions. Our design shares similarities with Charness and Levin (2005) as we
also ask for repeated assessments of the state of nature, which is represented by the
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composition of an urn. In our experiment, however, we focus on the signal’s impact
and the precision of initial beliefs.
The consistency of subjects’ choices is also studied by Friedman (1998) in his
analysis of the three door paradox. The subject faces three face-down cards, one of
which is the winning card. First, the subject chooses a card. Second, the experi-
menter turns over a non-winning card that the subject did not choose. Then the
subject chooses one of the two remaining cards. Finally, the two cards are turned
over. The participants play 10 trials. Bayes’ rule predicts that the subjects should
switch between their two choices. However, only 6/104 of the subjects switch more
than half of the time. Friedman (1998) explains this recurrent behavior by the illu-
sion of control (Camerer, 1995), i.e. the subjects’ belief that their initial choice is the
most likely, or by the non rational escalation of commitment (Bazerman, 1990), i.e.
the persistence in choices is viewed as a virtue and flip flopping as a vice. Friedman
(1998) proposes as an exploration of the three door paradox in which one manipu-
lates the subject’s initial choice by increasing the number of cards. In some ways
we pursue this endeavour as the number of possible urns in our experiment is higher
than the number of cards. Yet the subject’s choice is a similar one and lies in choos-
ing the correct urn/card in between all possible ones in two steps, where the first
step represents the formation of an initial belief. The main difference between the
two experiments is the fact that the signal may invalidate the initial belief of the
subject. The experiments in Charness and Levin (2005) and Friedman (1998) are of
particular interest to us as they underline the difficulty to predict subjects’ choices.
Ashton and Ashton (1988) study the sequential belief revision in five experiments
and how subject’s beliefs are influenced by the order and the presentation of new
evidence. They study the impact of validating/invalidating new information and
the degree with which it confirms the initial belief. The participants are auditors.
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They have to investigate the payroll records of a hypothetical client. They observe
the result of a preliminary investigation that indicates the probability that controls
would prevent errors was either 0.20, 0.50, or 0.80. Then, they receive validating
or invalidating evidence that can be either strong or weak. The study finds that
subjects are more willing to revise their belief after receiving new information, which
stands in contrast with Bayesian updating behavior. Moreover, the subjects revise
their belief to a greater extent after receiving new evidence that invalidates their
initial belief.
Ouwersloot, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (1998) study how the characteristics of mes-
sages impact the size of errors in updating beliefs. Subjects are asked to assess a
quantity. They are given a prior distribution of the unknown value and then receive
information. The experiment confirms that people do not apply Bayes’ rule. The
authors find that the deviations from Bayesian behavior are impacted by the char-
acteristics of the message, such as its precision, reliability, relevance and timeliness.
However, the precision of the message has only a small impact on the error of pre-
diction. The main limit of their experiment is that no proper incentives are given
to subjects. Subjects receive a fixed reward that does not depend on the correctness
of the answers. In our experiment subjects have to assess a risky state of nature
incorporating the information given by a pass/fail test and are incentivized to give
the correct answer.
A recent paper by Hoffman, Kagel, and Levin (2011) compares the impact of
simultaneous and sequential arrival of information on updating behavior.3 They
also investigate the impact of the order of receiving bad and good news on updating.
In a framed experiment, they ask subjects to determine the likelihood of having a
genetic disorder. In the simultaneous treatment, subjects receive the results of two
3We thank an anonymous referee for having suggested this article.
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biological tests at the same time. One of the tests declares that the subject has
the genetic disorder, whereas the second one claims that he does not have it. In
two sequential treatments, subjects receive the two results at a two week interval.
After receiving the first result they are asked to determine the likelihood of actually
having a genetic disorder. And then after two weeks, they have to determine it
once again but this time taking into account the results of both tests. The two
sequential treatments differ in the order in which good and bad news arrive. They
show that both sequencing and the order of the signals matters. Sequential arrival
of information biases the results compared to simultaneous arrival of information.
Subjects attach more importance on the latest information they got than to the
combined information. The authors note that one source of bias is the incomplete
adjustment to the initial test result received.
The updating process is still to be investigated and understood. People do not
seem to be exclusively Bayesian thinkers and there is a need for understanding the
different processes used in their decision making. Our experiment contributes to this
goal by analyzing specifically one kind of information: a signal that restricts the set
of possible states of the world, or more precisely, the use of a pass/fail test to assess
the characteristics of an object.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 The task
Subjects have to determine the number of yellow balls contained in an urn. The urn
is composed of 20 balls that can be either yellow or blue. The number of yellow
balls (between 0 and 20) is randomly drawn. Therefore, each of the 21 possible urn
compositions (representing a particular state of nature) has the same probability of
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being drawn. This is common information.
The subjects observe only a random sample drawn from this urn, whose size is
either 6, 10 or 14 balls. The size of the sample is also randomly drawn.4
Each period consists of two parts. In the first part, subjects observe the sample
drawn from the urn. They are then asked to predict the number of yellow balls in
the urn based on observing the sample. We call this first prediction the initial belief.
In the second part, the same sample is kept visible and the subjects receive a
signal about the urn’s composition. The signal indicates that the urn is composed
of either weakly more or strictly less than X yellow balls. The value on which the
test is based is randomly chosen from amongst the three possible values of 6, 10 or
14.5 This is common information. Therefore one of the following six signals is sent
to the subjects: There are LESS THAN (AT LEAST) X yellow balls in the urn, with
X being either 6, or 10, or 14. Subjects are then once again asked to predict the
number of yellow balls in the urn.
Each subject plays 50 periods of this experiment. In each period, the urn’s com-
position, the observed sample and the signal change.
2.2 The payoffs
Subjects were paid in cash in a separate room. They received a show-up fee of
€10. Subjects were also paid according to their predictions in three randomly drawn
periods. When they entered the payment room, they tossed a coin three times to
determine which part of each selected period was paid. If one of the predictions over
the three selected periods was correct, subjects received €10. If two were correct,
they received €15 and if three were correct, €20.
4As an illustration, see the instructions in Appendix 1.
5Given that the urn and the sample composition are random, the numbers 6, 10 and 14 are chosen so as to
ensure enough observations in each case.
10
This payoff rule induces subjects to provide, as a prediction, the number of yellow
balls which they believe to have the highest probability to be correct.
2.3 Optimal predictions
Given the fact that the urn’s composition, the observed sample and the signal are
drawn randomly from known distributions, it is possible to compute the number
of yellow balls that has the highest probability of being correct from a theoretical
perspective. This number, which we call the optimal prediction, is obtained using
Bayes’ rule.6 From the available information, Bayes’ rule allows us to compute the
probability associated with each urn from which the observed sample could have been
drawn. And the optimal prediction corresponds to the number of yellow balls con-
tained in the urn with the highest theoretical probability. The way this probability
distribution is computed is provided in Appendix 2.
In the first part, the most probable urn is the one having the same proportion
of yellow balls as the observed sample, since the number of yellow balls contained
in the urn is drawn from a uniform distribution.7 Therefore, in our setup, Bayesian
revision and representativeness are in line.
The computation of the optimal prediction in the second part follows the same
logic. Bayes’ rule is applied to take into account the information provided by the
signal, which restricts the set of potential urns from which the observed sample could
have been drawn. Given that the signal is randomly selected, the urns that remain
possible candidates after the signal is received are still ranked in the same order
6The objective of the paper is not to test if the subjects apply Bayes’ rule in forming their beliefs. Instead,
our goal is to study how individuals update their beliefs after observing a pass/fail test, regardless of the law or
heuristic they use in their revision process. Nevertheless, we think that predictions computed with Bayes’ rule
represent an interesting point of comparison.
7For instance, if the observed sample contains 6 yellow balls out of 10, the most likely number of yellow balls
contained in the urn is 12.
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with respect to their probability of occurrence. Therefore, the optimal prediction in
the second part is the same as the one in the first part when the corresponding urn
is still present in the set of possible urns. When it is not, the optimal prediction
corresponds to the urn in which the number of yellow balls is the closest to the first
part’s optimal prediction (see Appendix 3 for an example).
2.4 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the GATE laboratory, Lyon, France, using the
Regate software (Zeiliger, 2000). Using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004), we
recruited 81 under-graduate students from local business and engineering schools.
At the beginning of each session each subject was randomly assigned to a com-
puter. The subjects participated in the 50 periods of the experiment. At the end of
the session, they filled out a demographic questionnaire and were asked to provide a
brief description of how they made their decisions.
On average, a session lasted 60 minutes and subjects earned €15.
3 Results
First, we compare the predictions made by the subjects with the optimal ones, i.e.
the ones that maximize the expected gain. On average, the optimal prediction is
given in 36% of cases.8 In 60% of the cases, the prediction error is only one ball
with respect to the optimal prediction. We also observe that 20% of the subjects
give the optimal prediction in more than 50% of the cases. The data do not reveal
any other recurrent strategy. On average, subjects earned €15.16. If they had given
the optimal prediction, the average gain would have been €17.70 (see calculations in
8In the post experimental questionnaire 28% of the subjects declare having used the representativeness heuris-
tics to make their decisions.
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Appendix 4).
When the subjects receive a signal that invalidates their initial belief, they modify
their prediction in 98% of the cases and they choose the number of yellow balls that
is closest to their first prediction in the new set of possible urns in 30% of the cases.
When the subjects receive a signal that validates their initial belief, they change
their prediction in 50% of the cases.
Overall, we can conclude that in a majority of cases subjects do not use Bayesian
updating to make their predictions.
In what follows, we analyze how the signal affects the probability that the subject
predicts the exact number of yellow balls in the urn. We then investigate whether
signals that invalidate the initial belief affect the prediction accuracy differently than
signals that validate it. Finally, we explain why subjects change their predictions
when the signal validates their initial belief.
3.1 Impact of the signal on the prediction accuracy
For each subject we compute the proportion of correct predictions as the number
of predictions equal to the number of yellow balls contained in the urn divided by
the total number of decisions taken. Figure 1 plots the density of the proportion of
correct predictions in the whole sample. Figure 1.A (resp. Figure 1.B) shows this
density for predictions realized in the first (respectively second) part. A Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test9 shows that the two distributions of the proportion
of correct predictions in part 1 and in part 2 are significantly different (p-value =
0.000) and that the median of the distribution of correct predictions is higher in
part 2 than in part 1 (p-value = 0.000). Therefore, on average, signals sent to the
agents help them to correctly assess the number of yellow balls contained in the urn.
9Test of equality of distributions on matched data.
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Figure 1: Density of the proportion of correct predictions.
Result 1: The signal improves the accuracy of the subjects’ predictions.
In order to understand how the signal helps the subjects in assessing the number
of yellow balls contained in the urn we analyze the determinants of the probability
that the prediction made in part 2 (i.e. after the signal is received) is correct. The
potential determinants are the composition of the observed sample, the initial risk
level (before the signal is received), and the final risk level (after the signal is re-
ceived). Each subject makes predictions during a subsequent number of periods. The
post-experimental questionnaire shows an important heterogeneity in the strategies
reported by the subjects. This heterogeneity also appears in the data, as illustrated
in Figure 1. Therefore, there might be some underlying characteristics (observable
or not) that affect the decisions of the subjects. We account for the individual char-
acteristics persistent over time by (i) introducing individual observed characteristics
(reported by the subjects in the questionnaire) and (ii) allowing for the presence of
unobserved permanent characteristics by exploiting the panel dimension of our data.
We estimate a random effect logit model, that takes the following form:
Pr(Yit = 1) = βOSOSit + βIRIRit + βFRFRit + βXXi + αi + it, (1)
where Yit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the prediction made in part 2 by
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subject i in period t is correct. OSit represents the composition of the observed sam-
ple, measured by the observed proportion of yellow balls and discretized into three
categories.10 IRit represents the initial risk level. In the context of our experimental
design, the initial risk level may either be high (when the observed sample is com-
posed of 6 visible balls), medium (10 visible balls) or low (14 visible balls). Therefore,
a high risk level means that there are 15 possible urns from which the observed sam-
ple may be drawn. Medium and low risk levels correspond to 11 and 7 possible urns
respectively. FRit represents the final risk level, measured as the number of possible
urns remaining after the signal is received. Xi is a set of time-invariant observed
characteristics captured in the questionnaire (it includes indicators for gender, the
field of study and the first participation in an experiment). αi is a time-invariant un-
observed term assumed to follow a normal distribution and it is a period-individual
specific error term following a standard logistic distribution.
The results are reported in Table 1. In the first specification (column 1), we
include only the potential determinants that are observed by the subjects before
the signal is received: the composition of the observed sample and the initial risk
level. We observe that the higher the initial risk level, the lower the prediction
accuracy. The composition of the observed sample also plays a key role: subjects
perform better when the observed sample is composed of almost only yellow balls
(high proportion) or almost only blue balls (low proportion). We find evidence
similar to that of Tversky and Kahneman (1971), who show that the composition
of the sample is influencing the updating behavior. In the second specification, we
include the final risk level as a third potential explanatory factor. This element
represents the information provided by the signal: the more precise the signal, the
10The three categories are: (i) the proportion of yellow balls is lower than 0.1, (ii) the proportion of yellow balls
is between 0.1 and 0.9, and (iii) the proportion of yellow balls is higher than 0.9.
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lower the number of possible urns in part 2. We find that a decrease in the final risk
level has a positive impact on prediction accuracy. More interestingly, the coefficients
associated to the initial risk level become insignificant. Hence, only the risk level
remaining after the signal is received seems to influence prediction accuracy in part 2.
Result 2: Prediction accuracy increases with the precision of the signal.
3.2 Impact of invalidating signals on the prediction accuracy
Let us now turn to the question of how the prediction accuracy in part 2 is affected by
signals that confirm the initial belief (validating signals) on the one hand and signals
that do not (invalidating signals) on the other. There are 85% of validating signals
and 15% of invalidating signals. The first column of Table 2 reports the results
of the estimation of equation (1) in which an indicator of an invalidating signal is
introduced as an additional explanatory variable. The first column provides results
when the final risk level is not controlled for. We find that the probability that
the prediction is correct in part 2 is higher after an invalidating signal. This means
that a signal that does not confirm the subject’s initial belief improves a subject’s
prediction by more than a signal that confirms it.
In order to find an explanation for this pattern one has to remember that invali-
dating signals happen for two reasons: the subjects make a bad prediction in part 1
(far from the optimal prediction) and/or the observed sample is a bad representa-
tion of the urn’s composition. Thus, the positive impact of invalidating signals on
prediction accuracy may be caused (totally or partially) by the fact that invalidating
signals happen in situations in which the subjects are left with a low number of pos-
sible urns.11 We examine this potential explanation by running the same regression,
11Indeed, the coefficient of correlation between the number of possible urns after a signal and invalidating
signals is negative and high (-0.301).
16
Table 1: Impact of the Signal on the Prediction Accuracy in Part 2
Dependent variable : Indicator of correct prediction in part 2
(1) (2)
Composition of the observed sample:
Proportion of yellow balls ∈ [0, 0.1] 0.271∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.120)
Proportion of yellow balls ∈ (0.1, 0.9) ref. ref.
Proportion of yellow balls ∈ [0.9, 1] 0.242∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.124)
Initial risk level:
Low 0.248∗∗∗ -0.106
(0.097) (0.104)
Medium ref. ref.
High -0.264∗∗ -0.070
(0.105) (0.108)
Final risk level:
Number of possible urns in part 2 - -0.163∗∗∗
(0.019)
Constant -1.548∗∗∗ -0.216
(0.126) (0.194)
Control for individual observed characteristics yes yes
Observations 3,850 3,850
Log-likelihood -1905.429 -1866.237
ρ 0.027∗∗ 0.026∗∗
Logit model with random effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
ρ denotes the share of the individual (within-group) variance in the total variance. High, medium and low initial
risk levels correspond to situations in which the number of possible urns in part 1 is respectively 15, 11 and 7.
Individual observed characteristics are indicators for gender, the field of study and the first participation in an
experiment.
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Table 2: Impact of Invalidating Signals on Prediction Accuracy in Part 2
Dependent variable : Indicator of correct prediction in part 2
(1) (2)
Invalidating signal indicator 0.535∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.115) (0.130)
Number of possible urns in part 2 - -0.157∗∗∗
(0.035)
Constant -1.633∗∗∗ -0.275
(0.130) (0.216)
Control for initial risk level yes yes
Control for observed sample composition yes yes
Control for individual observed characteristics yes yes
Observations 3,850 3,850
Log-likelihood -1895.162 -1866.049
ρ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
Logit model with random effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; *
10%. ρ denotes the share of the individual (within-group) variance in the total variance. Individual observed
characteristics are indicators for gender, the field of study and the first participation in an experiment.
this time controlling for the final risk level, measured as the number of possible urns
left after the signal is received. The results are shown in the second column of Ta-
ble 2. We find that the higher the final risk level, the lower the prediction accuracy
(the impact of the number of possible urns in part 2 is negative). Moreover, the
impact of invalidating signals looses significance. This means that the higher proba-
bility of prediction accuracy after an invalidating signal can be attributed to the fact
that invalidating signals reduce the risk level associated with the urn’s composition
by more than validating signals and subjects are thus left with fewer options.
Result 3: Prediction accuracy is higher after invalidating signals than
validating signals. This is explained by the lower risk level left after
invalidating signals.
Let us now examine the prediction accuracy after validating signals more closely,
since it appears that the prediction accuracy is lower in such situations. When
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subjects receive a signal that confirms their initial belief, they change their prediction
from the one made in part 1 in half of the cases. We examine if the decision of
changing the prediction affects the prediction accuracy. In order to do so, we estimate
equation (1) in which we introduce an indicator variable for a prediction change
between the two parts as an explanatory variable. This estimation is conducted
only on observations for which the signal validates the initial belief. Results are
presented in Table 3. The first column provides results when the final risk level
is not controlled for. It shows that the probability of a correct prediction is lower
when the subjects change their prediction between the two parts. Again, one may
wonder if this result can be explained by the risk level remaining after the signal
is received. We thus run the same regression, this time introducing the number
of possible urns in part 2 as an explanatory variable. Consistent with the results
reported in the second column of Table 2, we find that a higher risk level has a
negative impact on the prediction accuracy. Nevertheless, the impact of a prediction
change remains negative and highly significant after we control for the final risk level.
We can conclude that validating signals have an adverse effect. In half of the cases
in which subjects receive a signal that confirms their initial belief they change their
prediction. And this updating behavior has a negative impact on the prediction
accuracy.
Result 4: Signals that validate the initial belief make subjects change
their predictions in half of the cases. The prediction change has a negative
impact on subjects’ performances.
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Table 3: Impact of Prediction Change on Prediction Accuracy in Part 2 when the Signal Vali-
dates the Initial Belief
Dependent variable : Indicator of correct prediction in part 2
(1) (2)
Indicator of prediction change -0.420∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.100)
Number of possible urns in part 2 - -0.138∗∗∗
(0.022)
Constant -1.426∗∗∗ -0.244
(0.141) (0.233)
Control for initial risk level yes yes
Control for observed sample composition yes yes
Control for individual observed characteristics yes yes
Observations 3,316 3,316
Log-likelihood -1591.493 -1572.065
ρ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
Logit model with random effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; *
10%. ρ denotes the share of the individual (within-group) variance in the total variance. Individual observed
characteristics are indicators for gender, the field of study and the first participation in an experiment.
3.3 Explaining prediction change when the signal validates the ini-
tial belief
In this section, we analyze situations in which subjects change their initial belief
when the signal validates it. Such situations are interesting in light of the results in
section 3.2, which showed that this behavior has a negative impact on the probability
that a subject’s prediction is correct. Moreover, the existing literature exhibits belief
persistence instead of belief change when dealing with risky situations (Charness and
Levin, 2005; Friedman, 1998). Thus, we investigate whether there are some situations
in which information revealed to the subjects may make them more likely to change
their prediction.
We estimate a random effect logit model in which the dependent variable is the
indicator of a prediction change between parts 1 and 2. This estimation is performed
on observations for which the signal confirms the initial belief. We explore the role
20
of the two factors that may explain why people change their beliefs: the evolution
of the risk level associated with the state of nature between the first and the second
part and the (objective) probability that the prediction made in part 1 is correct.
The evolution of the risk level takes into account both the risk level in the first
part and the reduction of the risk level between parts 1 and 2 induced by the signal.
The initial risk level may be either high (15 possible urns from which the observed
sample is drawn), medium (11 urns) or low (7 urns). The signal reduces the number
of possible urns from which the sample might be drawn. In order to obtain the final
risk level, the number of possible urns left after receiving the signal is discretized into
three categories, high, medium and low, if the number of possible urns is 12 or more,
between 8 and 11, or 7 or less respectively. The evolution of the risk level between
the two parts therefore falls into one of six categories: high-to-high, high-to-medium,
high-to-low (taken as the reference category because it corresponds to the highest
decrease in risk between the two parts), medium-to-medium, medium-to-low, and
low-to-low.
The probability that the prediction in part 1 is correct corresponds to the proba-
bility that the number of yellow balls contained in the urn is equal to the prediction
made by the subject in part 1, given the signal he received. It is calculated using
Bayes’ rule. This variable takes into account the composition of the observed sample
and the prediction that the subjects make in part 1. Therefore, it allows us to con-
trol for both the difficulty of the assessment problem (some urns are more difficult
to assess than others) and the subject’s performance in part 1.
Table 4 shows the results of this estimation. We find that only being in a situ-
ation of high initial risk level that is not reduced after the signal is received has an
increasing impact on the propensity to update the belief when the signal received
validates the initial belief. This result suggests that the decision to change one’s
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Table 4: Determinants of Belief Updating when the Signal Validates the Initial Belief
Dependent variable: Indicator for prediction change
Evolution of the risk level between the two parts:
high → high 0.516∗∗ (0.260)
high → medium 0.381 (0.256)
high → low ref.
medium → medium 0.355 (0.237)
medium → low 0.055 (0.261)
low → low 0.327 (0.231)
Probability of correct prediction at part 1 -2.596∗∗∗ (0.349)
Constant 0.595 (0.569)
Control for individual observed characteristics yes
Observations 3,316
Log-likelihood -1491.910
ρ 0.596∗∗∗
Logit model with random effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
ρ denotes the share of the individual (within-group) variance in the total variance. High, medium and low initial
risk levels correspond to situations in which the number of possible urns in part 1 is respectively 15, 11 and 7.
High, medium and low final risk levels correspond to situations in which the number of possible urns in part 2
is respectively 12 or more, between 8 and 11, and 7 or less. Individual observed characteristics are indicators for
gender, the field of study and the first participation in an experiment.
prediction is neither affected only by the initial risk level nor only by the fact that
the signal reduces the number of possible urns. Rather, it is the combination of
these two factors that plays a key role: the prediction change is more likely when the
subjects observe a sample of 6 balls and afterward receive a signal of low accuracy.
Concerning the impact of the sample composition and the subject’s first prediction,
we find that the probability that the prediction made in part 1 is correct decreases
the propensity to change the prediction when a validating signal is received. This
result suggests that when the subjects are more confident about their initial belief,
they are less likely to change it after receiving a validating signal.12
Result 5: When the signal confirms the initial belief, the subjects are
more likely to change their prediction when the initial risk level is high
12A closer look at the data makes it apparent that the subjects are less likely to change their prediction when
the observed sample is composed of around 100% or 0% of yellow balls and subjects play the optimal strategy
(their predictions are close to 20 or 0 yellow balls respectively) and regardless of the sample size.
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and remains high after the signal is received.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze how individuals update their beliefs when they receive an
imperfect signal. Our original contribution to the literature resides in the type of
signal sent to agents, which is a restriction of the set of possible states of nature.
More precisely, we analyze how subjects update their beliefs after receiving this kind
of signal for different levels of risk associated with the state of nature and for different
signal accuracies. We examine these questions in a laboratory setting with a two-
stage task. The subjects observe a partially revealed urn composed of 20 balls (yellow
or blue) and have to assess the total number of yellow balls in the urn twice, once
before a signal of the urn’s composition is observed, and once after such a signal is
observed.
We find that, on average, signals significantly help subjects predict the number
of yellow balls contained in the urn. Prediction accuracy decreases with the level
of risk (less precise signals). A signal that disproves a mistaken initial belief, i.e.
an invalidating signal, increases the probability of finding the exact composition of
the urn. Validating signals, however, may have an adverse effect. Subjects change
their prediction in half of the cases following a signal that validates their initial
belief and this change in prediction is associated with lower levels of prediction
accuracy. Furthermore, we show that in cases in which the signal confirms their
initial beliefs, subjects are more likely to change their prediction when the initial
risk level associated with the state of nature is high, i.e. the observed sample is
small, and the signal is not precise.
Our results suggest that signals corresponding to pass/fail tests are useful in
improving the assessment of the state of nature, especially when the first prediction
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is wrong. However, we find a limitation on the ability of this type of signal to better
inform agents about the state of nature. Moreover, individuals are more likely to
revise their beliefs in situations where the state of nature remains risky after the
signal is received.
The literature on updating beliefs has highlighted the persistence of subjects’
beliefs, whereas Bayesian updating requires changes (Charness and Levin, 2005;
Friedman, 1998). Our results suggest that subjects change their beliefs, even when
Bayesian updating requires persistence. We show that the evolution of risk associ-
ated with the state of the world significantly affects subjects’ behavior. Agents are
more willing to change their belief facing a riskier state of the world.
Our framework could readily be extended to introduce a measure of the degree of
confidence subjects have in their predictions. In a new experimental design, we could
ask subjects to provide a confidence interval around their predictions. We expect
that the higher a subject’s confidence level in their initial belief (first prediction),
the lower the likelihood that they change their initial belief. In this new setting,
we could also investigate if there exist some specific signals or situations that make
agents want to change their initial beliefs even if they are confident about them.
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Appendix 1: Instructions (original in French)
You are about to participate in an experiment during which you can earn money.
Your earnings will depend on your decisions taken during the experiment. Your
earnings will be paid to you in cash in private and in a separate room.
There are 50 periods in the experiment. Each period has two parts. In each period,
you see a partially revealed urn containing 20 balls. The balls may be yellow or blue.
In each part, you have to predict the total number of yellow balls in the urn. Your
earnings depend on your prediction of the total number of yellow balls. You increase
your earnings if you find the exact total number of yellow balls in the urn.
Period description An urn is composed of 20 balls: yellow or blue. The number
of yellow balls is randomly determined between 0 and 20. There are equal chances
that the urn is composed of 0 yellow balls, or 1 yellow ball,. . . , or 20 yellow balls.
The urn stays the same during the period. You can observe only 6, 10 or 14 balls in
the urn. The visible balls are randomly drawn from the urn.
Each period has 2 parts. The set of visible balls is identical for the 2 parts.
PART 1: You have to predict the total number of yellow balls in the urn. Enter
your answer with the scroll bar and validate it.
PART 2: The urn stays the same as in the 1st part. You receive complementary
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information on the urn’s composition. This information indicates if the urn is com-
posed with at most, or at least 6, 10 or 14 yellow balls. Then, you have to predict a
second time the total number of yellow balls in the urn. Enter your answer with the
scroll bars, even if your answer does not differ from your prediction in the 1st part,
and validate it.
Description of the added information on the urn’s composition You can
receive one of the following pieces of information:
• ≥ 6, there are AT LEAST 6 yellow balls in the urn.
• < 6, there are LESS THAN 6 yellow balls in the urn.
• ≥ 10, there are AT LEAST 10 yellow balls in the urn.
• < 10, there are LESS THAN 10 yellow balls in the urn.
• ≥ 14, there are AT LEAST 14 yellow balls in the urn.
• < 14, there are LESS THAN 14 yellow balls in the urn.
All six possibilities are not simultaneously possible for a given composition of the
urn. For example, when an urn has a total number of 8 yellow balls, only three
things out of six are possible:
• ≥ 6, there are AT LEAST 6 yellow balls in the urn.
• < 10, there are LESS THAN 10 yellow balls in the urn.
28
• < 14, there are LESS THAN 14 yellow balls in the urn.
The computer draws randomly and shows one of the possible pieces of information.
At the end of this 2nd part, you observe the complete urn and the predictions
you made in part 1 and in part 2.
A new period starts automatically when you validate the last screen. At each
new period, your task remains the same, but the following elements can be different:
• the urn’s composition
• the number of visible balls
• the information on the maximum or minimum total number of yellow balls in
the urn.
Payment Three periods over the 50 played are selected for your payoff. The three
periods are randomly drawn by the computer at the end of the experiment. They
can be different among the participants. Thus, you do not know in advance which
periods will be selected. Each period has the same chance to be selected.
For each of the three selected periods, only one part is chosen for your payoff.
When you enter the payment room, you determine the part selected for the payoff
by tossing a coin:
• if you toss tails, the 1st part is selected for your payoff.
• if you toss heads, the 2nd part is selected for your payoff.
To summarize, three periods are selected randomly by the computer and, for
each of the selected periods, you determine which part will be paid by tossing a coin.
Thus, three parts are selected for your payoff. Your payoff depends on the number
of exact predictions you have made for these three parts:
• If none of your three predictions is exact: your payoff is €0.
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• If one of your three predictions is exact: your payoff is €10.
• If two of your three predictions are exact: your payoff is €15.
• If all your three predictions are exact: your payoff is €20.
In all the cases, you will receive €10 more for your participation in this experiment.
It is forbidden to communicate with other subjects during the experiment. If you
have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.
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Appendix 2: Predicted Probabilities
Predicted Probabilities in Part 1
An urn is composed of 20 balls and the number of yellow balls contained in the urn
is chosen randomly (from 0 to 20). Therefore, there are 21 possible urns, with each
one having the same probability (1/21) of being drawn. Then, the probability to
observe sample S, given the urn from which the sample is drawn is Ui is:
P (S|Ui) =
Cysyu ∗ Cns−ysnu−yu
Cnsnu
where nu (resp. ns) is the number of balls contained in urn Ui, nu = 20, (resp. in
sample S) and yu (resp. ys) represents the number of yellow balls contained in urn
Ui (resp. in sample S). Then, according to Bayes’ rule and given an observed sample
S, the probability that this sample is drawn from urn Ui is equal to:
P (Ui|S) = P (S|Ui) · P (Ui)∑21
x=1 P (S|Ux) · P (Ux)
Given an observed sample S, the distribution of probabilities over the 21 possible
urns is obtained using this formula. The optimal choice for the subject is thus to give
as a prediction the number of yellow balls contained in the urn having the highest
probability.
Predicted Probabilities in Part 2
Now, we have to compute the probability that a particular observed sample is drawn
from each of the 21 possible urns, after a signal is received. According to Bayes’
rule, the probability that sample S is drawn from urn Ui given signal I (I stands for
information) is:
P (Ui|S, I) = P (S, I|Ui) · P (Ui)∑21
x=1 P (S, I|Ux) · P (Ux)
31
The signal sent to the agent is only based on the composition of the urn. In particular,
it is independent from the composition of the observed sample drawn from the urn
in part 1. Therefore, P (S, I|Ui) = P (S|Ui) ·P (I|Ui). P (I|Ui) is computed according
to the following logic. For a particular urn, among the six existing signals, only
three can be sent to the subject. Indeed, the number of yellow balls contained in
an urn cannot be both inferior and superior to the same number. Since the signal
is randomly chosen, the probability that a signal is sent is equal to one third if the
signal is a possible one, and 0 if the signal is inconsistent with the composition of
the urn. This leads to the following:
P (Ui|S, I) = P (S|Ui) · P (I|Ui) · P (Ui)∑21
x=1 P (S|Ux) · P (I|Ux) · P (Ux)
with
P (I|Ui) =

1/3 if signal I is consistent with the composition of urn Ui
0 if not
As is the case in the first part, the optimal choice for the subject is to give as
a prediction the number of yellow balls contained in the urn having the highest
probability, given the sample and the signal.
32
Appendix 3: Example of optimal prediction
Figures 2 and 3 display the probability distribution that different predictions are
correct for an urn where the observed sample is composed of 6 yellow balls and 4
blue balls.
Figure 2: Optimal predictions for a validating signal.
Figure 3: Optimal predictions for an invalidating signal.
In both figures, the optimal prediction in the first part (represented by light
bars) is 12 yellow balls as it is the number of yellow balls associated with the urn
having the highest probability to be correct. Figure 2 represents the case where the
subject receives a signal that validates his initial belief (indeed the signal states that
“there are at least 10 yellow balls”). Each one of the urns remaining in the new
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restricted set has a higher probability of being correct. Thus, the optimal prediction
in part 2 (represented by dark bars) remains the same (12) and its probability of
being correct increases. Figure 3 represents the case where the signal invalidates the
first prediction. The signal states that “there are less than 10 yellow balls” in the urn
and proves the optimal prediction to be wrong. In this case, the optimal prediction
in the second part corresponds to 9, which is the closest number to 12 included in
the new restricted set.
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Appendix 4: Expected revenue
The expected gain for one subject depends both on the number of correct predictions
he gives and on the likelihood that the period(s) at which he makes correct predictions
is(are) drawn at the end of the experiment. Three periods are drawn. The probability
that, among those three periods, a subject makes i correct predictions (and therefore
makes 3− i wrong predictions) is given by:
P (i) = C
i
n ∗ C3−in−c
C3n
, for i = 0, . . . , 3
where n represents the total number of periods played and c the total number of
correct predictions.
The expected gain is the average of the gains associated with 0, 1, 2 and 3 correct
answers drawn, weighted by the probability that the corresponding number of correct
answers is drawn:
ER(n, c) = C
0
c ∗ C3n−c
C3n
∗ 10 + C
1
c ∗ C2n−c
C3n
∗ 20 + C
2
c ∗ C1n−c
C3n
∗ 25 + C
3
c ∗ C0n−c
C3n
∗ 30
Given that, for the whole experience, the subjects made 7900 predictions, among
which 1492 were correct ones, the total expected revenue is ER(7900, 1492) =€15.16.
If every subject had played with the optimal strategy (consisting in giving as a predic-
tion the urn associated with the highest probability), they would have made 2340 cor-
rect predictions. In this case, the expected revenue would have beenER(7900, 2340) =€17.70.
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